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Secularization and the Birth of a Nation
The purpose of this paper is to make a contribution to the debate on sec-
ularization taking place today in our intellectual milieu. I believe that a dis-
cussion of the process of secularization independent of those processes taking 
place in the societal space of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is doomed 
to descend into prejudice. For this reason, I attempt to link two significant pro-
cesses which began in world history around 1800 and which continue to this 
day in various corners of the world. These are the formation of national iden-
tity and the process named secularization almost from the moment of its in-
ception. In this paper, I shall survey theories of the origin of secularization and 
anti-secularization, and of national identity and national consciousness. This 
minor research results in eight propositions, some of which represent conclu-
sions that follow from current quantitative and historical data, and others are 
hypotheses still to be proven. One significant outcome of these, I believe, is 
finding arguments against a kind of secularizational segregation. For example, 
I attempt to show that living as a society in a developed country neither theo-
retically nor practically means unconditional secularization, and the converse. 
We may say the same regarding fundamentalism. As far as the concept of sec-
ularization itself is concerned, I believe that the very process christened secu-
larization in the nineteenth century is in direct opposition to the essence of 
this word, and we could call it rather the ‘institutionalization of the sacral’. The 
process of the transformation of a religion into a universal institution, in the 
same way as the process of the formation of national identity, began spread-
ing at one and the same time and with the very same instruments (education 
and the mass media). As a result, we obtained two processes which challenged 
societies with their own versions of collective identity. I shall attempt to show 
that two types of institutional religion were formed as a consequence of this ‘ri-
valry’: transcendental (which works exclusively on a strategy to save the soul) 
and detranscendentalized (which is incorporated into national identity and 
which elaborates actions and future strategies from a perspective of national 
tradition). The numbers of their adherents in any society differ radically from 
each other. In any specific society, the percentage of religious people and, sim-
ilarly, that of churchgoers, as well as the presence or absence of fundamental-
ism, are dependent on which of these two types is present. I shall show below 
how this typology of currently existing religions explains quantitative material 
that is at first glance so inexplicable and which has accumulated over the last 
century as a result of research into world religions and secularization. 
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In the 19th century, social thinkers thought that religion gradually lost 
its importance together with the growth and development of industrialized 
society. Comte, Spencer, Durkheim, Marx, Freud, Weber – this is an incom-
plete list of those thinkers who considered that religion and religiosity would 
in the near future lose their influence and no longer play a significant role 
in the formation of people’s ideas and world view. As modern researchers 
point out1, these thinkers were not alone in this assessment. From the Age 
of Enlightenment on, philosophers, anthropologists and psychologists were 
pointing out that sacral practices and their accompanying rituals and institu-
tions were part of the past and, with the coming of modern times, would very 
much remain there2. In the twentieth century – especially in the first half – 
the death of religion was accepted in social science as conventional wisdom. 
The use of secularization3 in its modern sense of the decline of religion 
and religiosity began in the nineteenth century. The foundation for this was 
laid by the English thinker George Holyoake. He founded a secular society, 
a group with the aims of explaining the world without recourse to the idea 
of a supernatural force, and of elaborating a programme of individual moral 
behaviour4.
Max Weber was the first to thematize the departure of religion from the 
modern social world in his Protestant Ethic and Science as a Vocation. For 
Weber, secularization is part of the process of rationalization ongoing in the 
development of mankind. Rationalization for its part is a specific form of so-
cial change by means of which a ‘contemporary, modern world’ is realized 
and comes about5. One manifestation of rationalization is the disenchant-
ment from the world, or in other words, ridding the world of belief in magic 
and of magical rituals. All the same, in the opinion of some researchers, the 
disenchantment does not simply mean that people lose faith in the old mys-
teries of religion, but rather that the idea of a ‘miracle’ loses unconditional 
value6. In the final analysis, Weber was not saying that that religion would 
vanish from the world, but rather that religion and religiosity would become 
one authority among many, such as science, politics and others. From a re-
ligious perspective, it becomes one among many, and ministers of religion 
would have less authority in deciding issues of politics, economics and medi-
cine than they had in the past7.
The idea of secularization, as we noted above, was very popular, and 
every social scientist with few exceptions was convinced of its certainty up 
to the 1970s. Statistical data and various types of surveys existed to confirm 
this8, as did various church statistics. For example, in the United Kingdom 
the number of baptisms fell drastically between 1960 and 1983, from 55.4% 
of children under 12 months being baptised in 1960 to only 36.5% in 1983. 
61
Secularization and the Birth of a Nation
Similarly, the number of churchgoers fell from 6.2% in 1960 to 4.3% in 19839.
All the same, from the 1970s the growth of religious fundamentalism on 
the one hand, and the accumulation of differing statistical data on the other, 
created a crack in the belief that the idea of secularization was correct. Peter 
Berger, the classic sociologist of the twentieth century and one of the found-
ers of the sociology of religion, said in 1997: ‘I think that what I and most 
representatives of the sociology of religion wrote in the sixties on seculariza-
tion was a mistake. Our basic argument was that secularization and moder-
nity occur together. More modernization brings more secularization. This 
was not a foolish theory. There were data to confirm this theory. But I think 
that it is mistaken in its foundations. The greater part of the world today is 
not secular. It is very religious.’10
Quite a large number of facts and theories opposing secularization ac-
cumulated towards the end of the twentieth century and especially at the be-
ginning of the twenty-first. Arguments that oppose and raise doubt may be 
classified as follows:
(a) Statistical and factual arguments. Modern statistics, especially in 
the United States, point to an increase in religiosity and not to a decline11. 
A Gallop poll in the UK in 1986 showed that 76% of those questioned be-
lieved in God and in life after death, while 96% wanted compulsory teaching 
of religion to continue in schools. Research in 1983 showed that only 16% of 
those questioned considered themselves adherents of some religion or oth-
er. Besides this, research undertaken in the last century in oriental countries 
demonstrated that after the Second World War the inclination to undertake 
religious rituals was increasing among the educated youth. For example, in 
Japan it became fashionable the have new cars, houses and offices blessed 
according to the Shinto religion. In the same way, various kinds of exorcism 
were performed. There were more churches in Taiwan towards the end of the 
last century than in the nineteenth or in the first half of the twentieth century. 
In Hong Kong, the Wong Tai Sin church (founded in 1915) had, at the end of 
the century, the greatest number of adherents in its history. In the 1970s and 
1980s, studies of Muslims on the island of Java showed that the correlation 
between religiosity and education and a prestigious job was positive, or in 
other words, the more educated a person and the more prestigious his job the 
more inclined he was towards praying five times a day and, generally, towards 
orthodox Islamic practices than was the population in low status jobs and 
with less education. A study of Pakistan’s ‘fundamentalist’ movement showed 
(in 1991) that the leaders of this movement were well educated (to degree 
level) and that supporters of the movement were basically from the upper 
middle class. In the same way, the growth of religious belief among Turkish 
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students was established by various studies at the end of the last century12. 
Similarly, Islamic Calvinists: Change and Conservatism in Central Anatolia, a 
study published by ESI (European Stability Initiative) in 2005, opposes the 
secularization paradigm13. According to this study, a Calvinistic attitude is 
forming within Islam towards work and capital, or in other words, Islam is 
being interpreted as an ethos directed towards work and the accumulation of 
capital. The research group – through interviews with businessmen who dis-
play an instinct for high business and who at the same time remain follow-
ers of orthodox Islam, and through describing the enterprise environment 
organized by these – shows that what up to now, according to Weber, could 
only have originated within Protestantism, is possible in Islam without any 
practical application of the secularization of Islamic society.
(b) Theoretical arguments. The most significant theoretical argument, 
which is linked to the secularization paradigm, stems from new research-
es into history. A whole range of researchers into the history of religion say 
that ideas of people’s religiosity in past centuries are exaggerated, and do not 
correspond with reality14. According to these studies, the population in Eu-
rope was about as religious several centuries ago as it is now. According to 
some studies, the main quantitative indicator of religiosity – the number of 
churchgoers – did not change even in the most intense period of industrial-
ization (for example, in Britain from 1740 to 1865). Consequently, according 
to these theories, the secularization paradigm rests on the myth of ‘Europe’s 
former religiosity’ and on nothing more.
Yet another significant prejudice, on which, in the view of the anti-sec-
ularists, the enthusiasts for the secularization paradigm rely, is an incorrect 
idea of the Christianization of medieval Europe. In their view, Christianity 
was never deep enough in northern Europe to provide a large number of 
churchgoers and, similarly, neither for the population to hear of a change in 
the religious affiliation of their political leaders in the Reformation period15.
As further proof of this conclusion, Rodney Stark, the well-known re-
searcher into the sociology of religion, compared the time of the official 
Christianization of the countries of Europe and twentieth-century statistics 
on the numbers of churchgoers in these countries. In each case churchgoing 
and the time of Christianization turned out to correlate to a high degree16. 
This tells us that the factors of rationalization and disenchantment either do 
not work at all, or to such a very small extent that it is impossible to establish 
their impact quantitatively.
As far as subjective religiosity is concerned, we see a similar picture 
here too, the same as in connection with the institutionalized forms of reli-
gion: ‘contrary to the widespread view, in the Middle Ages there was a great 
63
Secularization and the Birth of a Nation
deal of scepticism [towards religion – author’s note], and of those some were 
quite radical’17.
David Martin was the first to cast doubt on the theories of seculariza-
tion18. As well as asking the question as to what enthusiasts of the seculariza-
tion theory meant by religion and religiosity, he at the same time cast doubt 
on the sufficiency of such statistical data as churchgoing. Using the example 
of Iceland, William Swatos affirmed19 that churchgoing far from correlates 
with society’s religiosity; rather, in modern societies, it is possible for it to 
correlate negatively with religiosity. Iceland, as the first secularized nation in 
the world, was used by the followers of the of the secularization paradigm as 
a clear example of secularization. Weekly churchgoing did not exceed 2%, so 
there was secularization. But Swatos’s and Gissurarson’s researches affirmed 
that, in present day Iceland, the proportion of baptisms and church weddings 
is very high. Similarly, there is frequent reference in newspaper obituaries to 
the immortality of the soul (as a rule, these are written by a family member 
or by a close friend). According to research in 1990 into world values, 81% of 
Icelanders believe in life after death, and 82% occasionally (20% frequently) 
pray outside of church. 40% believe in reincarnation, etc. Only 2.4% of Ice-
landers questioned were atheists.
The increase in religiosity in the countries of the post-Soviet bloc deliv-
ered a similar blow to the theories of secularization (the proportion of athe-
ists in Hungary fell from 14% to 4% between 1981 and 1991, while church-
going increased from 16% to 25%; in Russia, the number of those consider-
ing themselves irreligious fell from 53% to 37% in five years (1991-1995)20.
In spite of these theories and data, the secularization paradigm has its 
supporters who, it is true, do not entirely repeat Weber’s or Durkheim’s ar-
guments, but they do attempt to confirm the importance and validity of the 
secularization paradigm.
Neo-secularization theories. The idea behind Steve Bruce’s researches 
relies for support on a distancing from Weber’s type of secularization (ratio-
nalization), leaving it however as an indispensable mode of the modernization 
of secularization. The main idea of his book God is Dead: Secularization in the 
West21 is the following. Secularization occurs, not however owing to rational-
ization or the sciences, but rather owing to diversity and individual choice: 
‘Where diversity and egalitarianism become deep-rooted in social conscious-
ness and embodied in a liberal democracy, where the government is sufficient-
ly wealthy and stable, and where links to diversity and egalitarianism are not 
threatened with disappearance as a consequence of some unimaginable catas-
trophe, I cannot see anything that might turn round the process of seculariza-
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tion.’ Steve Bruce sees the main indicator of secularization in the diversifica-
tion of religious practices and in the reduction of their stringency. A change in 
religious practice and its transformation into something ‘softer’ are perceived 
by Bruce as a defeat of religion. As far as a past ‘golden age of belief ’ is con-
cerned, Bruce, like the opponents of the secularization paradigm, considers 
this to be a myth. In his opinion, however, the difference is in the influence of 
religious beliefs and ideas ‘then’ and ‘now’. The strength of Bruce’s arguments 
is in that he acknowledges the majority of those facts with which supporters of 
the secularization paradigm are armed (the small role of science, the influx of 
eastern religions, the increase in the number of religious sects, the reduction 
in the number of atheists, etc.) and he offers us an interpretation of these ac-
cording to the secularization paradigm. In Bruce’s argumentation all this indi-
cates a weakening of religiosity and the unhampered process of secularization. 
Bruce’s academic opponents, such as Stark and Swatos, point out that the con-
cepts of ‘change’ and ‘weakening’ are put on the same non-equivalent footing 
in Bruce’s argumentation. However, the main defect of Bruce’s book – and, it 
would appear, also its greatest strength – is that he writes solely of Britain, de-
voting only a single chapter to the US and describing the process of secular-
ization under way there as lagging 50 years behind Britain. In Bruce’s opinion, 
secularization is happening in the US, but is kept hidden by several factors: 
(a) by a tendency which ‘forces’ people to appear more religious than they are 
(there are no quantitative data to confirm their religiosity); (b) the large pro-
portion of migrants, who are from less modernized countries and are accord-
ingly more religious; and (c) the federal political structure: political diversity 
which offers inhabitants of the US the means to avoid cultural diversity.
When a dispute continues for quite a while in some scientific discipline 
or other, and an intellectual chasm very slowly widens between its supporters 
and opponents, and gradually takes shape as ideological poles, it is always to 
be expected that so-called conciliatory theories will be created. Conciliatory 
theories, it is true, do not offer us new facts and ideas, however, by a change 
in standpoint, they attempt to reconcile opposing poles and to present mutu-
ally opposing theories as separate instances of a general theory. I do not know 
whose was the idea of such an approach – Albert Einstein or some medieval 
theologian (it is a matter for the history of ideas) – but this approach does 
work, and all such attempts are interesting. We owe such an attempt regarding 
the secularization paradigm to Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart. The main 
idea of their book, Sacred and Secular, is an acknowledgement of the theories 
of the supporters of secularization and of its opponents. Secularization is oc-
curring in developed societies, say the authors of this book but, at the same 
time, religiosity is increasing in the world as a whole.
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The authors divide world societies into two, but not along moderniza-
tion / non-modernization lines. As they justly point out, it is easy to find a 
country where modernization occurs, but not secularization. Norris and In-
glehart introduce two additional factors which, in their view, draw a demar-
cation line between those countries and societies where secularization is hap-
pening and where it is not. These factors, in their view, are existential securi-
ty and cultural tradition22. The authors call these the two supporting axioms 
of their theory. The axiom of existential security consists in the following: A 
lack of human security is decisive for religiosity and, conversely, the greater 
the feeling of existential security in a society, the lower the religiosity. In oth-
er words, faith in the transcendental is widespread when a person cannot see 
in his environment guarantees of his own security. As far as the second axiom 
is concerned, this is expressed in the following manner: World views linked 
to religious traditions spread in the modern world without the direct involve-
ment of churches and religious institutions. For this reason, in spite of the 
fact that only 5% of the Swedish population, for example, are regular weekly 
churchgoers, the overwhelming majority of the population holds those ideas 
and values that were created within the Protestant religion. Accordingly, the 
authors conclude, the work ethic, sexual freedom and democracy in various 
countries will rely on historical religious traditions. Even those people living 
in a specific society who do not acknowledge a particular faith, and who do 
not belong to traditional confessions, become the bearers of complexes of be-
haviour and ideas that follow from these beliefs and values.
This is the scales on which are arranged today the theories for and 
against secularization. It is clear that in the modern world the relationship 
between the religious and the secular cannot happen by that simple construc-
tion which was thematized by Weber in his day (rationalization is equivalent 
to secularization). On the one hand, the accumulation of statistical material 
indicating an increase in religion and religiosity in developing and even de-
veloped countries and, on the other hand, the creation of a whole range of 
political theories stating that the role of tradition is an irreversible process23, 
give us reason to assume that the processes of secularization and sacraliza-
tion are more interesting and comprise more factors than even the authors 
of, for example, the theories of neo-secularization considered.
The purpose of this paper is not to criticize theories. I shall only point 
out, in connection with theories of neo-secularization, that considering tra-
dition as permanent or constant has been in doubt in the social sciences for 
some time now24, and even a tradition formerly sanctioned empirically and 
by conventional wisdom can turn out to have been invented in the recent 
past. On the other hand, we must point out regarding anti-secularization the-
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ories that the modern world is structurally so complex and diverse in com-
parison with the Middle Ages25 that a simple equivalence between religion 
and religiosity existing in the Middle Ages and in our time – inserting an 
equals sign – can in no way adequately describe the reality in which we live. 
Those theories which side with or oppose secularization theory have several 
ideas in common in how they describe the modern world. In other words, 
there are in these theories descriptions of the processes of secularization and 
sacralization occurring in the modern world which are shared by the ‘secu-
larizationists’ and the ‘anti-secularizationists’. These are:
1. Religiosity and churchgoing is increasing in developing countries;
2. Indifference towards, and a lack of understanding of, traditional 
interpretations and ideas of religion are increasing in developing 
countries;
3. There is an ongoing increase in religious fundamentalism in devel-
oping countries26;
4. Participation in traditional religious rituals is declining in devel-
oped countries;
5. The number of supporters of religions and religious ideas is increas-
ing in developed countries;
6. Institutional forms of religiosity are becoming ‘softer’ in developed 
countries than was the case traditionally in the past27.
A further significant idea on which those representing secularization 
and anti-secularization agree is that accounts of religiosity in the past are ex-
aggerated. In spite of the fact that supporters of secularization point out that 
the ‘decline in religiosity is not a sociological myth’28, nonetheless the total 
religiosity of medieval people is more linked to myths about the Middle Ages 
than to reality. The myth of medieval religiosity relies more on the idea that 
‘the Age of the Reason replaced the Age of Faith’ than on historical data29. 
Historians increasingly agree with the view that the Catholic idea of the Mid-
dle Ages, in the same way as the Reformation period, are nineteenth-century 
creations30. ‘A new age of Christianity commenced in Europe when churches 
gradually began to lose the support of governments after 1800 and to self-or-
ganize. And this did not happen until the new mass media and school educa-
tion had changed the Christianization of everyone into a reality.’ 31
This is the environment in which the present-day discussion over sec-
ularization revolves. By adding several new facts we shall attempt below to 
make even clearer the processes of secularization and sacralization occurring 
in our environment. 
In the quotation from the Dutch scholar Wim de Ruyter (‘Dark, back-
ward and barbarous’. In: Newsletter 1. Leiden Institute for the Study of Reli-
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gions. pp. 3-8) cited above by William Swatos, he directs attention to the link 
between the mass media and school education and the spread of religiosity. 
In other words, it follows from this conclusion that rationalization as the ba-
sis of the mass media and school education appears as something that sup-
ports religiosity, and not secularization.
If we run an eye over the map of twentieth-century thought, we see 
that the creation of the social institutions of the mass media and universal 
school education is linked by two important scholars – Ernest Gellner32 (the 
institution of universal education) and Benedict Anderson33 (the institution 
of the mass media) – to the birth of nationalism. In other words, these two 
processes are linked by them to the creation of the basis of nationality and 
national self-identity. Below, I briefly describe both theories which, together 
with a further theory of Anthony Smith’s34, laid the foundation for one of the 
most significant debates in the history of thought: that on the origins of na-
tions and national consciousness.
All three theories say that nationalism – or, more precisely, the idea of 
the nation – is an artefact and that its origin is linked to specific socio-politi-
cal and cultural developments in the history of mankind. Agreement among 
these theories stops with this consensus and the differences begin. Gellner 
defines nationalism as ‘a political principle according to which the political 
and the national must be congruent with each other’. This is a completely new 
principle typical of modernity. Before that, states were not organized accord-
ing to the national35.
Gellner highlights three stages of history: hunting-gathering, agro-lit-
erate and industrial. 
Nationalism appears with the transition from the agro-literate culture 
to the industrial stage. In the agro-literate stage the elites see an advantage in 
cultural diversity. Under such circumstances nothing threatens their power 
at this time. 
In industrial societies ‘a high culture pervades the whole of society, de-
fines it and needs to be sustained by the polity’. In an industrial society the 
changing nature of work demands cultural homogeneity. In other words, a 
need is created for impersonal, context-free communication.
Besides this, an industrial society is dependent on perpetual growth in 
order to satisfy demands. It is possible to achieve perpetual growth only by 
implementing constant changes in the structure of granting employment. 
The high level of technical skills demanded means that many places have to 
be allocated on the basis of merit. This renders necessary a certain egalitari-
anism and, at the same time, makes general training essential before special-
ized training, so as to meet the need for job mobility. 
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Thus education occupies an important place. Education begins to de-
fine an individual’s status, in the same way as kinship did in the earlier agro-
literate society. 
Consequently, the state brings together the state and culture. For this 
reason, a need was created for all areas of cultural penetration to be covered, 
and nationalism is the only way for this coverage to be realized successfully.
Anderson’s Imagined Communities was published in the same year as 
Gellner’s Nations and Nationalism (1983). Anderson’s basic hypothesis is the 
following: The decline in the influence of religion gave rise to new concepts of 
time, which for their part gave rise to the possibility of imagining the nation. 
Before nationalism there existed ‘great religiously imagined communi-
ties’, such as, for example, the Christian, which was based on a common lan-
guage (Latin, for example). Together with diffusion and expansion Europe-
ans discovered that their concepts of existence were not the only ones. In the 
same way, the factor of Latin as a common language began to weaken and 
the so-called vernacular languages began to revive.
While Europe existed as a great religious imagined community, it was 
the concept of time which united and gathered history together. The past, 
present and future were not linked as cause and effect, but rather by means 
of divine will. In such a concept of time the word ‘meanwhile’ made no 
sense. After the collapse of this kind of society it became possible to imagine 
such a situation without ‘simultaneous time’ but with ‘homogeneous, emp-
ty time’ instead. The marking out of such a type of time was possible using 
the clock and the calendar, and was responsible for theoretically incidental 
coincidences.
Then the age of print capitalism ‘arose’. Latin lost its monopoly after 
some time, and new books began to be published in national languages. 
Here, Protestantism and its concept of internal salvation were particularly 
important. Books, newspapers and short stories were printed and distrib-
uted, and gave rise to the idea in readers of the simultaneous existence of a 
group of readers like themselves who make use of the output of cultural pro-
duction in the same way as they do. 
1. This production created for readers three fundamentals of national 
consciousness:
2. A unitary field of movement in both directions between Latin and 
the vernacular languages;
3. A new means of fixing the language and thus a basis for the idea of 
the permanence of the nation;
4. Languages of power which differed from the Latin language preva-
lent up to then.
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Anderson argues that nationalism is a consequence of the develop-
ment of a mixture of secularization, human diversity, capitalism and print-
ing technology.
Smith’s theory is based on ‘ethno-symbolism’. Smith was Gellner’s pu-
pil and he attempted to overcome the difficulties of Gellner’s modernist 
perspective.
The main weakness of the modernist perspective is its inability to ac-
count for the passions unleashed by nationalism. Why do people fight and 
die for their own nation if nationalism is merely a tool created by the elite to 
increase their economic gains and for economic unity? 
Smith argues that all nationalism is based on an attempt by ‘a specif-
ic group’ to confer on history a sense of common identity and of common 
history. This does not mean that this history must be adequate academical-
ly. Smith says that much nationalism is based on historically erroneous in-
terpretations, and strives to completely mythologize certain parts of its own 
history.
Nationalism, according to Smith, does not demand that the members 
of a ‘nation’ be similar, only that they must feel solidarity with the nation and 
with the other members of the nation. A feeling of nationalism can be creat-
ed from any ideology dominant in a given place. Nationalism will grow from 
pre-existing kinship and from religious and belief systems.
These three theories examine nationalism and the formation of na-
tions from three varying perspectives: constructivist (Gellner), traditionalist 
(Smith) and reductionist (Anderson). In this case, the consequence of these 
three theories for the debate between supporters of secularization and anti-
secularization is of interest. As we noted above, religiosity, church member-
ship, and the church as a modern idea – which implies the existence of be-
lievers and a shared doctrine – are, in the view of several historians, a result 
of the nineteenth century. In other words, religion only became universal and 
linked to identity after it became possible to spread the doctrine of religion 
by means of education and the mass media. If this corresponds to histori-
cal reality, then the narrative of medieval [European] religiosity is more the 
invention of a tradition than a description of historical reality. On the other 
hand, if we rely on the theories of Gellner, Smith and Hobsbawm, the inven-
tion of a large-scale tradition – in other words, the ‘discovery’ of a tradition 
which is calculated to define the identity of all citizens living in a specific 
area – is an exclusive procedure of nationalism. Thus we take on the task of 
simultaneously explaining a mechanism for the spread of religiosity and na-
tionalism, their mutual dependence – since they spread by identical means 
– and their importance in the formation of identity.
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It is possible for doubt to arise: What is right in connection with Euro-
pean religiosity might not be correct in the case of other religions, such as 
Eastern Christianity, where there was a custom of holding worship in sepa-
rate languages. In this case, worship in a separate native language fulfilled a 
role in religious identity. All the same, I still think that, in the case of Eastern 
Christianity, worship in the local language had a role only in the formation 
of linguistic identity, so much did the forms taken by religious worship differ 
from one another and from the ecclesiastic centres in the absence of perma-
nent and institutionalized informational and educational links. 
We may say the same about other religions within which worship was 
not held in a language unknown to the population. The lack of communica-
tion between specific leaders of religious worship and differences created in 
the historical process explain, on the one hand, the origin of the diverse ten-
dencies of eastern religions (Islam, for example) [up to the nineteenth cen-
tury] and, on the other hand, the great efforts expended by the unifiers of 
countries on the abolition of religious differences and of dissenters.
Thus we may state the not unreasonable hypothesis that no identity 
whatsoever existed in the world up to the start of the nineteenth cen-
tury which united large groups of people and aligned their cultural or 
state boundaries with this identity. Not only is nationalism an invention 
of modernity, but also we must begin reckoning the history of identity of 
any kind, [beyond the boundaries of kinship, acquaintance or clan], from 
around 1800. Language did not form the basis of social identity because, to 
begin with, it functioned in several different states and, if someone used it 
in the meaning of identity, this was perhaps only within the framework of a 
discourse justifying expansion36. 
Accordingly, the picture of world and social history is much more dra-
matic than it appears at first glance. Only after the nineteenth century does a 
universal social mechanism originate by which a person – a total stranger to 
you and with whom you have no physical or kinship connection – might not 
be alien. Naturally, such mechanisms existed in the Middle Ages and earlier, 
however only the middle or upper classes had permission and means to use 
these exclusively. Religious orders and secret societies shared the same char-
acteristics, but they lacked universality and a principle of common consent 
on membership37.
Thus we have a picture of religiosity and nationalism as universal insti-
tutions: social paradigms created at approximately one and the same time. 
Structurally, the two have one main common characteristic: both are based 
on the invention of tradition but, if nationalism is based on an invented tra-
dition of the past and by dint of these attempts to extend its own schema 
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over its followers, religiosity accumulates believers by creating a tradition 
of the future. By tradition of the future I mean those religious practices by 
which it is possible, through specific individual efforts, to attribute a legiti-
mate picture of a specific and clear future to the person making these efforts. 
This is an immanent part of the structure of all religions. Naturally, the latter 
is not the first-born child of modernity, but an emphasis on the creation of 
a tradition of the future, its advancement at the expense of other character-
istics and qualities, and its broadening from a path of personal salvation to 
an axis of collective identity must be consequences of modernity.
I think that we may be able to describe two forms of religiosity in our 
world. One is a part of nationalism and occupied in the process of creating 
a tradition of the past. This occupation can be manifested differently in dif-
ferent countries: as an increase in religious extremism in the Near East, or 
as fundamentalist propaganda in some Eastern European countries. And the 
other is when institutionalized forms of religion preserve ‘transcendental-
ism’. In other words, they are directed towards individual salvation and offer 
members of society strategies to elaborate a tradition of the future. 
In the first case we are concerned, not with the secularization of society, 
but with the detranscendency of religion. When religion becomes a part of 
a tradition of the past38, and behaves as an institution for the invention and 
preservation of a tradition of the past, in this case religiosity is a significant 
– but yet individual – instance of national identity. In place of God, nation-
ality and the nation become determining factors in religious discourse39. We 
can observe in many countries of the world a process of the detranscendency 
of religion and instances of its role in society in the creation of a tradition of 
the past. As an indicator of this, by establishing the difference between the 
percentage of the population acknowledging membership of a specific de-
nomination and the corresponding percentage of churchgoers, it is possible 
that a significant but indirect indicator might be discovered. We shall speak 
about this below.
It appears that there is no foundation whatsoever for talk of some kind 
of secularization in respect of societies and nations in today’s world. What is 
more, it may be said that our world, both intellectually and in its way of life, 
is gradually moving away from a secular past (in the Middle Ages) and is 
becoming ever more religious. This process of sacralization is happening in 
two ways: by inventing traditions of the past and traditions of the future, in 
other words, by putting in place frameworks of national and religious iden-
tities and summoning followers to fill these frameworks.
Thus sacralization in our world has two paths: the sacral as an end (a 
tradition of the future) and the sacral as a means (a tradition of the past):
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National consciousness in Old World countries is almost entirely ow-
ing to religion. I can only hypothesize in the case of the US. There the birth 
of the nation was structurally a religious act. The American nation was born 
by construing a tradition of the future, so diverse were the religions, tradi-
tions, ways of life and cultures of the people newly arrived on the continent. 
As Alexis de Tocqueville noted, if east coast Americans and the pioneers of 
the north had something in common, this was the Bible and the documents 
adopted by the legislative organs, and, in the same way, those ideals articu-
lated in these documents. It is possible in this way – by the orientation of the 
value construction of this specific nation, not on the past, but on the future 
– to explain the popularity of institutional religion in this country. ‘Being 
American’ is so individualistic and so directed toward working out a strate-
gy of personal ‘salvation’, that the average American should not feel any kind 
of discomfort by incorporation into some religion or other. On the contrary, 
that act – participation in religious worship – should assist him in feeling a 
full member of the American nation. All the same, I cannot say that a tra-
dition of the past plays no part in the construction of American nationality. 
Today, a Buddhist or Muslim as American president is inconceivable.
As far as ‘old’ European and oriental nations are concerned, their old-
ness, it appears, is manifested fundamentally in construing a tradition of the 
past. The education system, as Gellner said, ‘takes to the people’ the national 
idea, and the mass media, as Anderson said, creates the basis of nationality. 
In a whole range of countries, discourse on cultural identity is impossible 
without explicit mention of the history of religion (Protestant and Orthodox 
countries, oriental countries where worship is held in the national language, 
also Catholic countries whose culture was closely linked to Catholicism in 
the invention of tradition). In this case, the national idea accomplishes the 
spread of religion and, accordingly, this very easily becomes the establish-
ment of religiosity by the national idea as one of its own modes. In this in-
stance, the detranscendentalism of religion is realized unhindered, and two 
ways remain for the institutional forms of religion: either they must agree 
with detranscendentalism (in this case they will have guaranteed a large 
number of adherents and [even if only formally] the support of the politi-
cal / national administration), or they must attempt to play an independent 
game and work to create a tradition of the future.
Besides historical conditions and the political environment, the choice 
of the institutional development of a specific church is dependent on specific 
people, who take specific decisions at a specific time. This decision is expressed 
verbally thus: What must the Church do? – submit itself to the idea of nation-
alism and become detranscendentalized, or work to elaborate a tradition of the 
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future, entirely directing itself toward offering specific people institutions of 
personal salvation, and to uniting its adherents under a strategy of salvation. 
In this case, it enters into competition with the national idea and with nation-
al institutions which, besides a whole range of advantages40, already offer their 
own followers a detranscendentalized religion, or in other words, much more 
than a transcendental church could offer. Of course, a transcendental religion’s 
offering is much more meagre (in forms of content and expression it is the rich-
est of all, including oriental religion). It is for this reason that transcendental 
religion hopelessly loses the struggle with detranscendentalized religion for the 
number of adherents.
However, this defeat in no way means secularization. Firstly, in spite of 
the fact that transcendental churchgoing is low, it will still be more than it was 
in the Middle Ages. Secondly, in terms of structure and worship, a detranscen-
dentalized religion does not differ at all from a transcendental one and, in many 
cases, as a creator and preserver of a tradition of the past it can turn out to be 
even stricter. This should explain that quantitative fact as to why churchgoing 
is 3% in Denmark and 26% in Spain, in spite of the fact that in both Denmark 
and Spain the number of those confirming a religious affiliation is very high. 
The explanation is manifest: religion is detranscendentalized in Spain, but not in 
Denmark41. In the same way, it is noteworthy that when analyzing the countries 
of northern Europe, together with the percentage of weekly churchgoers we also 
need to take the growth in evangelical and other ‘house churches’ into account42.
An intermediate level of churchgoing, in the range 3% to 20%, for ex-
ample (among such countries are those of the former socialist bloc and of the 
Soviet Union) should indicate that the leadership of the institutional forms of 
religion in these countries either has not taken a decision on detranscendental-
ism versus transcendentalism, or that the decision has been taken, but the pro-
cess of detranscendentalization had not yet been completed. As an example of 
this we may cite the development of the Orthodox Church in Georgia over the 
past twenty years. In spite of the fact that the Church hierarchy took a decision 
in the 1990s on detranscendentalization43, which was expressed not only in the 
appearance of a religious nationalist discourse, but also in the aggressive expan-
sion of religious worship on a countrywide scale44, we still cannot say that this 
decision has been fully implemented. In the discourse of representatives of the 
Georgian Orthodox Church, strategies directed toward a tradition of the future 
are still frequent which, in a certain sense, is linked to the poverty of part of so-
ciety and, we may say, to a loss of social hope. 
For this reason, interpreting quantitative data on sacralization and secu-
larization necessitates not the introduction of additional variables, but rather 
an analysis of the discursive and institutional practices of religions. 
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An increase in fundamentalism could be an indirect indicator of those 
societies where religion is detranscendentalized, regardless of location in the 
world and creed affiliation. The expression of this fundamentalism varies, 
from acts of terrorism to opposition to the insertion of religious tolerance 
in education laws and to opposition to restrictions on teaching religion in 
school. 
Thus fundamentalist societies can be on the list of either developed or 
developing countries. The generalized response of these societies to challeng-
es arising in the global world varies, but not how they view these challenges.
It would appear that the profile of every specific society and the tran-
scendentalism or detranscendentalism of its religions are dependent on spe-
cific political circumstances and on the specific decisions of specific peo-
ple. Accordingly, the more church hierarchies might revisit the decision, 
or might choose a transcendental ecclesiasticism, the more the number of 
weekly churchgoers will decline, although it is possible that the numbers of 
church weddings and baptisms might increase, as a process of partaking in 
the national idea or tradition. And the converse: The more churches and re-
ligions in the world set out on the path of detranscendentalism, the more the 
number of churchgoers will increase and the more the church/religion will 
attempt to become an essential attribute of the nationalist state.
For this reason, when we discuss secularization and sacralization, we 
must always take into account specific religious practices and discourses. 
Only after analyzing these is it possible to account for the religious reality 
around us. 
I may thus formulate my position in the debate on secularization by 
making the following points:
1. In most countries of the world the spread of the nationalist idea and 
of religiosity, and their potential to become universal, occur simul-
taneously (after 1800), and are accomplished by the same instru-
ments (education and the mass media).
2. The origin of the national idea is in most cases based on the con-
temporary idea of religiosity. The invention of a national tradition 
is in most cases based on the invention of a religious tradition; thus 
the birth of a nation is linked to the universal institutionaliza-
tion of religion. In most societies, it would appear, a national ide-
ology and tradition will arise from the invention of a tradition of 
the universality of religion.
3. There exist two forms of institutionalized religion / church in the 
modern world: the transcendentalized, which offers society strate-
gies directed toward the future (personal salvation, saving the soul), 
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and the detranscendentalized, which works as a preserver of a tra-
dition of the past in which the idea of the nation takes the place of 
the idea of God, and which is a separate (although possibly most 
important) instance of nationalist tradition and philosophy. The 
second offers its adherents a strategy of saving souls, only in this 
case saving the soul is linked to devotion to national traditions.
4. A detranscendentalized religion is closely linked in its activities and 
discourse to state institutions and to the majority of the population, 
since it is a part of national identity and can spread ‘together with 
the state’. For this reason, the number of adherents of a detran-
scendentalized church is greater than of a transcendentalized 
one which offers the adherent only the saving of the individual soul. 
5. Such a typology of churches explains the differing percentages of 
religiosity (number of churchgoers) in various countries. The pres-
ervation of national identity is the main stimulus for participa-
tion in a detranscendentalized church. Accordingly, participation 
in worship at the same time means participation in the preservation 
of the nation and in firming up a secure collective environment.
6. There is no law according to which we can say unambiguously 
why one church or another is transcendentalized or detranscen-
dentalized. This is always a consequence of specific persons (in the 
church hierarchy) and political causes / environment.
7. The detranscendentalism of religion is not characteristic of so-
cieties solely in developed or in developing countries. The devel-
opment status of a country is no indicator of the type of modern 
church / institutionalized religion. We may encounter a detran-
scendentalized religion in Europe (e.g., Spain) as well as in the East 
(e.g., Iran). In both cases it is possible to describe the religious at-
titudes of society as fundamentalist, however, in both cases, the re-
sponses of these societies to global world challenges differ.
8. It is possible to encounter hybrid transcendentalized - detran-
scendentalized churches / institutionalized religions, a situation 
when a decision on (de)transcendentalism has not yet been taken 
or has not yet been fully implemented. ‘Average’ churchgoing (3–
20%) in a range of countries (e.g., Hungary, Georgia) is explained 
by this hybridism. It is possible that the explanation of this hybrid-
ism might be linked to the presence of poverty in society and a lack 
of social hope (that is, to a rejection of the national / state idea).
Owing to all the above we may say that the process of secularization, if 
it exists at all, does not divide the world into developed and developing coun-
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tries. All the same, if we adduce additional indicators (such as statistics on 
church baptisms and weddings, ‘domestic religions’, informal practices, and 
the like) it is possible that secularization might turn out to be a process oc-
curring in the heads of relatively very few people over a relatively very short 
period of time.
That process which begun after 1800, and which was called [errone-
ously, in my view] secularization, caused irreversible changes throughout the 
whole world, irrespective of the type of society or culture. Two very impor-
tant modes of our social environment are consequence of this process: that 
structure of national identity which characterizes us, and that form of insti-
tutionalized religion / church as spread both within and without us.
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